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I.  Introduction
The global financial crisis (GFC) that began in the US as a sub-prime
mortgage crisis in 2007 and quickly spread to the other side of the
Atlantic, triggered an economic and banking crisis in parts of the
European Union coincident with a sovereign crisis in parts of the
European periphery, most notably in Greece. Banks, which in the years
before the crisis, had taken considerable if not excessive risks to expand
size and scope in the quest for higher profits, were confronted with
adverse pressures incited by a dramatic reduction of liquidity in the
interbank money market.
With continuing financial market turbulence, falling lending volume,
rising defaults, compounded by exposures to distressed sovereigns,
European banks found it even more difficult to remain profitable, if not
viable post-GFC. Consequently, stronger emphasis was placed on
economic support from Government to the banking sector. While the
ECB’s newly established long-term-refinancing-operations (LTRO)
program was providing some financial sector relief, nagging concerns
were raised about the interconnectedness of Eurozone governments with
their banks, a situation that looked set to be further embedded, given
how many banks had been willing subscribers to the politicians’ view
that the LTRO money should be invested in sovereign debt.1 The
financial crisis soon turned into a fiscal crisis.
Addressing sovereign solvency problems is much more complex
than corporate solvency, since sovereigns cannot be liquidated. And
sovereign debt restructuring is more likely to have major repercussions
for both the borrower and creditor economies, as evident by
international experience beset with disorderly sovereign debt
restructuring episodes.2 This study sets out to assess the extent and
direction of the relationship between banks and their sovereigns in
Eurozone countries during a crisis.3 More specifically, it focuses on the
1. See The Economist (2011).
2. Bini Smaghi (2011) argues that debt workouts in the public sector are quite different
involving not only financial but also political and social adjustment costs. Sovereign defaults
can have costly spillovers beyond sovereign credit markets with high haircuts being a signal
of untrustworthy economic policies (Cole and Kehoe 1998). There can also be adverse effects
on trade (Rose 2005), private sector access to credit (Arteta and Hale 2008), or for the
financial sector (Acharya and Rajan 2013). 
3. Paltalidis et al. (2015) provide evidence that sovereign credit risk is the primary
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effects of the Greek sovereign debt crisis around a specific event,
namely, the 2011/2012 Greek debt restructuring program. The key
hypothesis is that large restructuring programs involving large haircuts
such those under PSI intensify the nexus between sovereigns and banks. 
Admittedly, Greece is the Eurozone country which faced the most
severe problems since the onset of the financial crisis.4 The country's
potential insolvency would directly affect banks and other creditors with
significant exposures to Greek sovereign debt, raising the probability of
transmitting risk to private creditors and countries, e.g. a Greek default
could trigger ‘runs’ on other euro sovereigns and their banks, while
widening the spreads of sovereign and bank Credit Default Swaps
(hereafter CDS). Normally, it would be expected that during a financial
crisis an increasing share of the variability of sovereign credit risk to be
explained by bank credit risk (see, e.g., Lahmann, 2012; Vergote, 2016).
However, Greece is different insofar the trouble started from public
finances and then moved on to banks. This means that price discovery
would be expected to move from sovereign to bank CDS recognizing
the potential costs of contagion were not limited to the loss of Greek
assets only. Countries with weaker banking sectors and public finances
(e.g. Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) were particularly vulnerable to
contagion.
A series of important measures were put in place during the crisis,
aimed at reducing country-specific credit risk, systemic credit risk in the
Eurozone, and the strong nexus between sovereign and bank credit risk.
Among these measures, was the program of the ‘voluntary’ exchange of
Greek bonds with the participation of the private sector (Private Sector
Involvement -PSI- 10/2011). The intent of PSI was to put forward a
sustainable and credible debt restructuring program in place, reducing
source of systemic risk in the Eurozone countries through its effects on the banking system.
4. The Greek crisis became public in October 2009 after the newly elected centre-left
government announced that public finances were far worse than previously thought with the
2009 budget deficit forecast revised upwards from 3.7% (April) to 12% (October) and
eventually to 15.6% of GDP, boosting public debt to more than 120% of GDP. By late 2010,
it had become fairly clear that any hopes of debt sustainability had quickly evaporated, and
at the October 2010 Deauville Summit, France and Germany put forth a proposal for the
creation of a permanent crisis resolution mechanism inclusive of a sovereign debt
restructuring process with the participation of the private sector. While the intent of the new
plan was to prevent contagion spreading among Eurozone countries in the event of an ensuing
debt crisis by one of the weaker members, the announcement increased turmoil in the
financial markets with European periphery bond spreads rising sharply, as investors fretted
over wider Eurozone sovereign debt haircuts amidst dismal Eurozone growth prospects.
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the debt to GDP ratio to 120 percent by 2020,5  by transferring part of
the debt burden to the private sector and consequently to private
financial institutions,6 which held a significant amount of Greek public
debt in their portfolios. The program was perceived as a strong signal
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European
authorities to the private sector, that fully funded bailouts of banks and
their sovereigns were no longer tolerable. As noted by The Economist
“the impact of laying out a credible path to debt sustainability could be
powerful. Greeks could start to believe they have a way out of the crisis;
investors could put money in the country with more certainty. It could
create a positive circle of confidence and growth.” (The Economist 10
Nov. 2012).
However, the ‘voluntary' participation of the banking sector to the
PSI program had important consequences for their capital adequacy
ratios because of the replacement of the Greek government bonds that
they held in their portfolios, with new ones, whose nominal value was
greatly reduced.7 The situation exacerbated bank credit risk pressure as
banks were forced to raise capital at higher cost to offset their
investment portfolio losses, commensurate with the rise of sovereign
credit risk.8 Adding to the uncertainty were concerns about the mere size
of the program, lack of experience (the first time a major sovereign debt
restructuring program being managed away from Washington DC), and
complications arising from time delays and amendments to the
program.9 According to Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati (2013) the
5. Euro Summit Statement of October 26, 2011.
6. The press release of the Hellenic Ministry of Finance on February 24, 2012,
specifies, in detail, the terms of the PSI program.
7. There was a significant rise of the sovereign CDS spreads of Greece, as well as those
of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain following an announcement at the Euro Summit of 21
July, 2011 that the ECB would not participate in the voluntary PSI program involving an
estimated net contribution of EUR 37 billion by banks and insurance companies.
8. An important element in the program was a promise by the Eurogroup to compensate
through recapitalizations Greek banks for their PSI losses, thereby avoiding a major banking
crisis in Greece which was more than likely to emerge since Greek banks had already suffered
losses of about EUR 38 billion or about 170 percent of their total Core Tier I capital in 2011.
9. Cruces and Trebesch (2013) show that achieving a higher degree of debt relief at
present can have benefits in the short-run but may also worsen borrowing conditions in the
future. More precisely, they find that higher haircuts are associated with (i) higher
post-restructuring spreads; and (ii) longer duration of exclusion from capital markets. While
this is also evident from the recent experience of Greece culminated in its on and off long
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PSI contributed to the avoidance of a financial collapse in Greece and
beyond (except for Cypriot banks which were not compensated for
restructuring related losses as Greek banks) but at the same time a
number of costly policy mistakes were made with respect to the timing,
design and execution of the exchange.10 They contend that the debt
restructuring was necessary, albeit not sufficient, to deal with an
increasingly dire situation.
As far as the collateral damages caused by the PSI are concerned, the
program created a “doom loop between sovereigns and banks with
severe adverse effects on banking systems and economies throughout
the periphery of the euro area (see Orphanides, 2014). PSI had a major
negative impact on Cypriot banks owing to their exposure on Greek
debt, triggering a negative feedback loop between banks and their
sovereign in light of the sheer size of the Cypriot banking system and
faltering public finances.11 Banking sector difficulties in Cyprus first
appeared on October 2011, with Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
borrowing from the Central Bank increasing sharply from EUR 0.1
billion in August to EUR 2.7 billion, while total bank borrowing from
the Eurosystem, jumped from EUR 5.8 billion in August to EUR 8.0
billion, an amount close to half the country’s GDP (see Hardouvelis,
2016). The two largest Cypriot banking institutions lost almost 4 billion
euros from the haircut of Greek Government bonds (see Zenios, 2016).
While both banks had major operations in Greece, they did bear the
brunt of losses whereas banks in Greece were fully supported through
a mechanism of recapitalizations. Under these conditions, an
unprecedented for the Eurozone bail-in program was necessary for the
recapitalization of the Cypriot banks through losses imposed on
uninsured depositors and bank bond holders as the Cypriot government
was unable to rescue its banks and prevent a financial crunch.12
exclusions from capital markets, the important question is about the counterfactual, namely
the extent and pervasiveness of the problem without restructuring.
10. They estimate that implementing a deep restructuring earlier could have saved at least
10 billion euros in bond amortizations between July 2011 and early 2012.
11. The Cypriot banking system was the largest in the Eurozone expressed as a
percentage of the country’s GDP, with assets totaling over 8 times GDP (see Zenios, 2013).
It was our intension to include Cyprus in the sample; however, CDS data were not available
for Cypriot banks.
12. According to Demetriades (2018) “the crisis was triggered by losses from the Greek
PSI in late 2011 in the island’s two biggest banks. But its roots were in the doubling of the
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This study examines the dynamic causal interactions between
sovereign and bank CDS spreads during the period of the Eurozone
sovereign debt crisis. Specifically, it investigates the lead-lag
relationship between sovereign and bank credit risk of 8 Eurozone
countries and 21 banking institutions during the period January 2009 to
May 2014, paying particular attention to the causal effects of the PSI
program. For this reason, the sample period is split around the formal
announcement of the program on 26 October 2011. The Chow
breakpoint test shows that the date of the PSI announcement is a
significant structural break in the data, supporting the choice to divide
the sample period based on the event date. Using different econometric
techniques, the present study addresses the following questions. Was the
PSI program effective in mitigating the nexus between banks and their
sovereigns? Were such effects more pronounced in the causal
relationship running from Greek sovereign CDS to bank CDS? Which
countries were more vulnerable?
A step-by-step procedure is followed to test empirically linear and
nonlinear causal relationships between the sovereign and bank CDS
series. First, linear causality between sovereign and bank CDS spreads
for the periods before and after the PSI program is assessed, utilizing
Granger and Hsiao causality tests combined with Impulse Response (IR)
and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) analysis. For
robustness, a difference-in-difference model is also employed, to study
the causal relationships between the sovereign and bank CDS premiums
over the full sample period. Second, nonlinear causal effects between
the CDS series are assessed in both subperiods, applying the nonlinear
dependence BDS13 test and the non-parametric Diks and Panchenko
(2006) (hereafter D&P) causality test. In addition, nonlinear causality
tests are performed on VAR- or VECM- filtered residuals, thereby
removing systematic linear causality patterns from the data. This
enables to check if any observed causality is strictly nonlinear (see
banking system in the previous six years due to large capital inflows, primarily from Russia
and Ukraine." Thus, Cyprus was different insofar the core problem there was massive inflows
mainly from Russia with the consequent exposure to Greek sovereign debt to ascertain a
return that was high enough to offer Russian depositors an enticing return on their
investments. It was a risky gamble that did not pay off. For banks in the core Eurozone
countries, the exposure to Greek debt was more a portfolio allocation issue with obvious
repercussions but not a gamble. The situation for Greek banks was also different in that they
were coerced to buy into Greek debt, whereas this was not the case for Cypriot banks.
13. Brock et al. (1996).
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Bekiros and Diks, 2008). GARCH effects are a potential source of
nonlinearities between the CDS series, which in turn may affect the
robustness of causality tests. Autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity is filtered out using a bivariate GARCH-BEKK (1,1)
model and re-run the non-parametric causality test using standardized
residuals. The aim is to capture higher-order causal relationships by
using volatility-filtered series, in order to ascertain if nonlinear causal
relationships in the data persist after second moment filtering rather
than being driven purely by volatility spillover effects.
The tests reveal significant linear and nonlinear dynamic causal
relationships between the CDS series. Causal effects are found to be
bidirectional in the majority of cases, especially during the first period,
and this finding is preserved as we move from linear to nonlinear
causality testing. A public-to-private risk transfer, consistent with the
aim of PSI, is observed. In particular, it is found that the strength of both
linear and nonlinear causal effects between banks and sovereigns
appears to ease-off in the period following the implementation of the
PSI program. Moreover, it is observed that volatility spillovers underpin
the nonlinear Granger causal relationships. However, the
interconnectedness between the series persists after first and second
moment filtering. This implies that any nonlinear causal linkages
between the CDS series are not solely due to volatility effects. It is
concluded that the PSI appears to have had some success in containing
the nexus between sovereign and bank credit risk during the sovereign
crisis.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in two directions:
First by applying a more comprehensive econometric approach
comprising linear and nonlinear causality tests to analyze the nexus
between banks and sovereigns, and second by providing new empirical
evidence on the relationship between sovereign and bank credit risk in
view of an important policy intervention, the PSI effect. The nonlinear
econometric framework extends previous research by capturing the
complex interlinkages between the CDS series during a period of highly
volatile conditions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
reviews the existing literature on the relationship between sovereign and
bank credit risk. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the
methodology and discusses the empirical results. Section V summarizes
the main conclusions.
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II.  Literature review
Since the global financial crisis, much empirical research in
cross-country studies has focused on the relationship between sovereign
and bank credit risk. The consensus is that this relation has developed
beyond a simple local affair into interdependence and contagion
between countries and banks.
Contagion is an elusive concept with several definitions on offer in
the literature.14 The World Bank, for example, regards that contagion
occurs when transmission of shocks between countries increases in
times of crisis, compared to the corresponding transmission in tranquil
periods.15 Constâncio (2012) defines financial contagion as a situation
in which instability in a specific market or institution is transmitted to
one or several other markets or institutions, with the transmission
process causing non-expected, abnormal relationships between markets
or intermediaries. Under this situation a crisis reaches systemic
dimensions.  In the same vein, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) define
contagion as an extraordinary increase in cross-market linkages after a
shock to one country or a group of countries. In the case where the
co-movement remains stable after a shock in relation to a tranquil period
then any increase in the correlation between two markets or economies
is due to the existence of interdependence. In this case, the transmission
mechanism is driven by market fundamentals.
Since we focus solely on a crisis period, it is reasonable to assume
that there has been already a structural change in the transmission
process.16 Hence the question is one of degree and scope, viz. whether
contagion risk was heightened and widened across countries and banks
in the transition from the financial to the sovereign crisis (e.g. as a result
of a shift from a bad equilibrium before PSI to another bad equilibrium
after PSI). As in Sander and Kleimeier (2003), a narrow definition of
contagion is used focusing on changes in the presence and direction of
causality during different phases of a crisis, while maintaining the
14. Dungey et al. (2005) provide a detailed review of different methods used to identify
contagion.
15. www.econ.worldbank.org.
16. As evident from the sharp rise of CDS spreads and their volatility in the European
periphery which may be difficult to reconcile on the basis of fundamental drivers, recognising
that economic conditions (i.e. market fundamentals) in the majority of these countries were
only changing gradually (Delatte, Fouquau and Portes 2014).
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assumption that multiple equilibria may exist.
Masson (1999) contends that a crisis in one country or market could
influence investors’ expectations causing contagion effects and
spreading the crisis to another country or market due to a shift from a
good to a bad equilibrium. These expectations are not driven by changes
in macroeconomic fundamentals - as may be the case under a good
equilibrium - but emanate from uncertainties about multiple equilibria.
Based on this approach, contagion arises when self-fulfilling beliefs
about bad equilibria locally are diffused to other countries or markets,
with contagion effects expected to be more pronounced in countries or
institutions with weaker economic fundamentals. This is arguably the
case in Greece where both the sovereign and its financial institutions
were in serious trouble because of rapidly worsening economic
conditions, whereby a bad situation was getting worse because of loss
of confidence and increasing investor risk aversion.
Much literature is devoted in analyzing the feedback relationship
between sovereign and bank credit risk. Brunnermeir et al. (2011, 2016)
refer to the relationship between sovereign and bank credit risk as
“diabolic loop": European banks hold too much of their national debts,
which, far from being safe, encourage speculation on the solvency of the
banks. Sovereigns, in turn, face a constant risk of having to rescue their
banks, which, combined with the uncertainty on what fiscal support they
will receive from their European partners, increases the riskiness of
their bonds.
During normal times, a strong relationship between bank and
sovereign CDS would not be expected, with the causality more likely to
run from bank CDS to sovereign CDS rather than the other way around.
However, this is likely to change during crises periods, especially with
increasing incidence of stress in the banking system coupled with weak
fiscal fundamentals. A host of studies provide empirical evidence on the
nexus between banks and their sovereigns. Alter and Schüler (2012)
analyze CDS spreads of 7 Eurozone countries and their domestic banks
during the period from June 2007 to May 2010 using a vector error
correction framework. They find that in the period before the bailout of
financial institutions, sovereign credit risk is driven mainly by bank
credit risk. However, this result is reversed in the period after the
bailout of the banking sector.
Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2014) develop a novel theoretical
model describing a ‘two-way’ feedback between financial sector and
sovereign credit risks that accounts for both - “an ex post deadweight
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cost of sovereign default in external markets and an internal cost to the
financial sector through bank holdings of government bonds”. They
verify empirically, using a sample of Eurozone countries during the
period 2007 to 2011 that “such a feedback loop is indeed present due to
the financial sector’s implicit and explicit guarantees and holdings of
sovereign bonds”. Sovereign CDS spreads rise significantly reflecting
a rise in sovereign credit risk, with the worsening of the sovereign’s
creditworthiness feeding back into a weakened financial sector,
confirming the bank-sovereign loop. In a recent study, Yu (2017), using
a sample of European countries and banks from 2006 to 2012, finds no
significant interaction between sovereign and bank CDS spreads, at the
country level, in the period before the financial crisis. However, the
dynamic causal linkages become significant after the onset of the
subprime crisis, before they recede again until the Greek debt crisis. She
concludes that before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, bank CDS
spreads were the leading factor influencing sovereign CDS spreads,
while during the Eurozone debt crisis sovereign CDS spreads assume
this role because bank guarantees and bailout programs weakened fiscal
conditions.
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) highlight the reverse credit risk
channel from sovereigns to banks using an international sample of
banks. They find that bank CDS spreads in fiscally strapped countries
rose remarkably during the financial crisis because these countries were
deemed fiscally weak to safeguard financial stability. Thus, stressed
sovereigns are not able to provide support to the large financial
institutions, which have become too big to be saved. Mody and Sandri
(2012) analyze the feedback loop between the joint occurrence of public
debt accumulation and deterioration of banks’ balance sheets. By
examining the determinants of weekly changes in the sovereign bond
spreads of 10 Eurozone countries over the period January 2006 to May
2011, they find that countries with weaker competitiveness were prone
to greater sovereign stress resulting from financial sector weakness. The
empirical analyses highlighted two nonlinearities: First, sovereign
spreads in countries with a slower growth potential are more adversely
affected by financial sector shocks. Second, financial shocks have a
larger impact on countries with higher public debt ratios. These results
are in accordance with our findings, where causal effects from sovereign
to bank CDS are more pronounced after PSI in countries with weaker
fiscal fundamentals.
In addition, several studies support the main conclusion of this paper
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that the strength of the causal linkages between banks and sovereigns
has been restricted after the implementation of the PSI program. More
specifically, Alter and Beyer (2014) show that during the European
sovereign debt crisis, and more generally during periods of distress, the
interaction between CDS spreads increases significantly, while policy
interventions diminish the spillover effects between sovereigns and
banks in the Eurozone. Similarly, Vergote (2016) shows that there are
significant feedback causal effects between sovereigns and financial
institutions in the Euro area, particularly during the intense phases of
the crisis. However, the spillover effects from sovereigns to financial
institutions are reduced after policy interventions aimed at confronting
the European sovereign crisis. On the other hand, the effects from the
financial sector to the sovereigns are not diminished, despite banking
sector reform.
Tamakoshi and Hamori (2013) analyze causality between the CDS
index of the banking sector of the Eurozone and the sovereign CDS
spreads of Greece, for the period of 2008 to 2011. Before the debt crisis,
they identify unidirectional transmission of credit risk from bank CDS
to the sovereign CDS spreads of Greece. However, during the crisis, the
situation is different as there is a significant influence of Greek
sovereign CDS spreads on bank CDS. In a similar vein, Bhanot et al.
(2014) find that an increase in Greek sovereign yield spreads, during the
turbulent debt crisis period, had significant spillover effects on the
financial sectors of different Eurozone countries driven in part by
ratings downgrades and other negative events about Greece.
Drawing on such an argument can be made in support of PSI,
recognizing that well designed and well supported debt restructuring
programs may be successful in reducing market uncertainty and hence
the nexus between banks and their sovereigns.17 Admittedly, Greece had
reached a point of distress making a default almost unavoidable with the
overriding question being one of collateral damage inflicted on private
creditors, mainly financial institutions, but also on other sovereigns
through contagion. With Italy and Spain dragged into the crisis by
17. Alexakis et al. (2018) argue that the debt restructuring process (PSI) in Greece did
not bring the expected results since it was not combined with the appropriate structural
reforms and effective policy measures. They propose a series of remedies - economic
growth-linked bonds, fiscal balances over the growth cycle, structural reforms, the use of real
option analysis in relevant public policy areas - that could be useful for the restriction of the
distress in Greece and the Eurozone as a whole, and the attainment of stability and sustainable
growth.
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mid-2011, decisive action was imperative to deal with an increasingly
dire situation. While not problem free, the PSI program was embedded
with sufficient sweeteners to creditors to make best of what was feasible
under the circumstances, avoiding the financial collapse of Greece while
minimizing risks to other sovereigns (Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati,
2013).
However, it is not suggested that CDS spreads will be lower in the
immediate period following the PSI announcement, irrespective of
whether the program is ultimately deemed to be successful or not. We
concede that there is high degree of uncertainty surrounding a major
debt restructuring initiative, from its announcement to the period
immediately after its implementation. With the benefit of hindsight, the
program was successful in achieving 96.9 percent participation on the
total nominal debt amount, in part as a result of the attractive terms
offered.18,19 Our results verify that the causal effects between the
sovereign CDS spreads of Greece and bank CDS of other Eurozone
countries have been contained.
Recognizing the nonlinear structure in bank and sovereign CDS
spreads, during a turbulent period for Eurozone, where significant
structural changes are potential sources of a nonlinear causality pattern
between them, an alternative methodological approach is applied to test
(1) whether the nonlinear causal interlinkages between sovereign and
bank CDS are amplified after PSI; and (2) if these effects are driven by
volatility spillover effects. To our knowledge, this is the first study in
the relevant literature aiming to capture nonlinearities in the
transmission mechanism across countries and banks.
The majority of studies in the empirical literature use parametric
linear Granger causality tests based on VAR models to examine the
causal linkages between sovereign and bank credit risk. However,
18. The main terms were a near cash offer of EUR 15 billion in short-term EFSF
securities, an upgrade of governing law with new bonds of varied maturities issued under
English rather than Greek law, and more importantly a co-financing agreement with EFSF
which in essence meant that it would not be possible for Greece to default on the new bonds
without at the same time defaulting on the EFSF loan. An added feature to the program, and
one that would enhance greater creditor participation was a clause ascertaining that no CDS
would be triggered before the bond exchange was initiated.
19. According to Coudert and Gex (2013), the main reasons for this “bloodless”
settlement were the following: the arrangement concerned only the net positions of the
investors, protection sellers did not have extra demands as guarantees for this settlement due
to regular margin calls, bond-holders were compensated for their shortfalls by protection
sellers to the face value of their bonds.
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nonlinear feedback relationships are likely to be more pronounced
during financial crises.20 Nonlinear causality tests have been developed
by Baek and Brock (1992) and modified by Hiemstra and Jones (1994)
(hereafter H&J) to allow each series to exhibit weak temporal
dependence. D&P (2005) show that the H&J test tends to over-reject the
non-causality null hypothesis, since it does not take into account the
possible variation in conditional distributions under the null, especially
when the size of the sample increases and bandwidth values are low. In
a follow up paper, D&P (2006) propose a non-parametric causality test
as a modified version of the Baek and Brock (1992) and H&J tests.
Dajcman (2015) investigates nonlinear interdependence between
sovereign bond markets in the Eurozone during the European sovereign
debt crisis using the D&P nonlinear Granger causality test. The results
show that there are significant nonlinear causal effects between the time
series for the period before the crisis, while spillover effects decline in
the period after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis.
Caporin et al. (2018) use sovereign CDS spreads to study
nonlinearities in the transmission of sovereign credit shocks in the
Eurozone. Applying nonlinear, quantile and Bayesian quantile
regressions that allow for heteroskedasticity, they find no evidence of
change in the intensity of the transmission of shocks since the onset of
GFC. They interpret this finding as absence of sovereign risk contagion
among Eurozone countries recognizing their sample period ending just
before the PSI (September 2011) announcement may not be long enough
to identify significant changes in the propagation mechanism. Amisano
and Tristani (2011) study nonlinearities in the transmission of sovereign
credit risk in the Eurozone using a regime-switching model over the
period from January 1999 to December 2010. The model captures
abnormal variations of sovereign yield spreads after a shift from a
‘normal’ to a ‘crisis’ regime. They find that the probability of entering
the crisis regime increases when a country’s fiscal position worsens, and
this increase is amplified by contagion mainly driven by an increase in
market risk aversion.
Billio et al. (2012) apply bivariate linear and nonlinear Granger
20. Brock, Hsieh and LeBaron (1991) contend that nonlinear causality tests are able to
detect the existence of higher-order causal relationships between the series, in contrast to
those solely focusing on the conditional mean, such as the linear Granger causality test. This
is important since linear causality tests may incorrectly identify a unidirectional relationship
between two series when in fact the relationship may be nonlinear and bidirectional (see H&J,
1994).
Multinational Finance Journal224
causality tests and principal component analysis using monthly stock
returns of hedge funds, brokers/dealers, insurance companies and banks,
to model the diffusion of the systemic risk during the financial crisis.
They find significant causal linkages among the different financial
sectors. Furthermore, Billio et al. (2014) model the interconnectedness
among countries, banks and insurance institutions in a multi-country
framework, by using credit spreads. Based on contingent claim analysis
and network measures, they show that there are significant dynamic
interactions among sovereigns, banks and insurance companies during
the GFC and the European sovereign crisis. However, the effects arising
from sovereigns to banks and insurers are more significant during the
European sovereign debt crisis.
III.  Data description
Daily prices of senior unsecured sovereign CDS spreads on 5-year
government bonds are used, considered as those with higher liquidity,21
and the respective senior unsecured bank CDS spreads. The sample
period ranges from 1 January 2009 to 30 May 2014. The higher the
value of CDS spreads, the less likely a country or a banking institution
will be able to meet its debt obligations. In the empirical literature, it is
observed that CDS premiums have established as the main proxy for
credit risk, since the inception of the global financial crisis.22
Daily data on CDS spreads are extracted from Thomson Reuters
Datastream and Bloomberg. In the analysis, we consider those countries
of the Eurozone that experienced major debt problems during the recent
financial turmoil, viz. Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Ireland (IR), Portugal
(PT), and Spain (SP) known by the acronym GIIPS. Moreover, the
Netherlands (NL), France (FR) and Germany (DE) are included. These
countries possessed in their portfolios major shares of GIIPS debt. The
selection of the sample of banking institutions in each country is based
on their total assets and on the availability of the data for the period
under review.
The CDS spreads are expressed in basis points (bps) and
transformed into natural logarithmic values recognizing the wide
21. Hull, Nelken and White (2004).
22. Fontana and Scheicher (2010).
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FIGURE 1.— Daily Sovereign log CDS series multiplied by 100 -
01/01/2009 - 30/05/2014
variations in spreads for some countries and banks during the period of
analysis.23 The bank CDS spreads in the sample are weighted by using
their total liabilities in each year to calculate the index of bank CDS
spreads for each country. Furthermore, in order to study the nexus
between the CDS series at the aggregate level, new CDS series are
calculated by weighting the sovereign CDS spreads for the eight
eurozone countries based on their gross domestic product each year, and
the corresponding banking sector CDS spreads according to the annual
liabilities of each banking institution. For robustness, the unweighted
sovereign and bank aggregate CDS series are also employed.
To analyze changes in the lead-lag interaction between sovereign
and bank credit risk as a result of the PSI program the reporting period
is divided into two subperiods. The break point is determined
exogenously to be 26 October 2011, the date of the announcement of the
decision of the European Summit for the implementation of the
‘voluntary’ exchange program of Greek bonds with the participation of
23. Forte and Pena (2009).
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FIGURE 2.— Daily Bank log CDS series multipiled by 100 -
01/01/2009 - 30/05/2014
the private sector. Chow breakpoint test results verify that this date is
a significant structural break in the relationship between all pairs of
CDS series.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the evolution of the log CDS series
(multiplied by 100) during the sample period. The vertical line indicates
the PSI announcement date that separates the sample. It is evident that
the CDS series of most countries and banks are close to their maximum
levels around the PSI period; however, they start to decline soon after.
Greek sovereign CDS spreads continue to rise to exceptional levels
during the period of the PSI program although they too decline
eventually. The steep rise of Greek sovereign CDS spreads in March of
2010 is indicative of heightened concerns about a Greek sovereign
default, with the country losing access to the bond markets in April
2010. The effects are spreading to other Eurozone countries, especially
those with weak fiscal fundamentals, triggering large increases in
Italian, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish sovereign CDS premia. Although,
France, Germany and the Netherlands have stronger fundamentals, a
similar upward trend in their CDS spreads during the period leading the
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean(bps) Std. Dev. Min(bps) Max(bps) Skewness Kyrtosis
A. Descriptive statistics of sovereign CDS spreads - Period 1 (1 Jan 2009 - 26 Oct 2011)
GR 735 900.47 1168.94 100.27 6751.79 2.99 12.40
PT 735 320.48 304.39 37.00 1227.89 1.36 3.98
IT 735 141.66 79.05 48.00 482.04 1.90 6.73
SP 735 158.26 76.90 47.00 378.81 0.60 2.53
IR 735 356.87 237.85 96.92 1191.15 0.88 2.81
FR 735 60.53 29.28 21.00 164.93 1.19 4.48
NL 735 51.93 23.63 26.49 130.00 1.49 4.55
DE 735 36.74 14.86 17.96 92.50 1.41 4.95
AllCountries
(Weighted) 735 112.51 68.50 36.09 387.09 1.88 6.95
AllCountries
(Unweighted) 735 253.37 226.03 54.03 1225.02 2.16 7.96
B. Descriptive statistics of bank CDS spreads - Period 1 (1 Jan 2009 - 26 Oct 2011)
GR_Banks 735 250.20 173.34 48.11 797.88 1.23 4.35
PT_Banks 735 218.02 178.76 37.44 690.08 0.92 2.87
IT_Banks 735 56.25 35.25 17.94 183.64 1.49 5.08
SP_Banks 735 72.69 33.52 29.28 165.42 0.84 3.11
IR_Banks 735 677.74 567.48 155.00 2298.98 1.23 3.39
FR_Banks 735 40.56 14.58 21.06 103.98 1.72 6.47
NL_Banks 735 45.38 15.75 25.65 106.03 1.60 5.18
DE_Banks 735 30.07 8.16 17.30 63.03 1.32 5.04
( Continued )
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TABLE 1. (Continued)
Variable Obs Mean(bps) Std. Dev. Min(bps) Max(bps) Skewness Kyrtosis
B. Descriptive statistics of bank CDS spreads - Period 1 (1 Jan 2009 - 26 Oct 2011)
AllBanks
(Weighted)  735 58.56 25.69 26.20 144.61 1.22 4.20
AllBanks
(Unweighted) 735 173.86 121.18 47.88 507.27 1.11 3.17
C. Descriptive statistics of sovereign CDS spreads - Period 2 (27 Oct 2011 - 30 May 2014)
GR 677 5399.97 5432.59 391.63   25960.76 1.22 3.99
PT 677 557.90 348.21 143.95 1521.45 0.81 2.21
IT 677 249.67 106.21 87.73 498.66 0.59 2.32
SP 677 233.47 106.31 62.83 492.07 0.33 2.30
IR 677 261.51 212.75 48.65 729.19 0.84 2.08
FR 677 62.66 36.96 25.79 171.56 1.01 2.76
NL 677 65.11 30.51 28.46 133.84 0.74 2.10
DE 677 24.63 15.48   9.16 72.35 1.26 3.52
AllCountries
(Weighted) 677 239.69 168.75 50.84 744.72 0.73 2.41
AllCountries
(Unweighted) 677 82.30 31.27 31.40 158.34 0.29 1.99
( Continued )
229
T
h
e
 E
ffe
c
t o
f th
e
 P
S
I in
 th
e
 R
e
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 B
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
o
v
e
re
ig
n
 a
n
d
 B
a
n
k
 C
re
d
it R
isk
TABLE 1. (Continued)
Variable Obs Mean(bps) Std. Dev. Min(bps) Max(bps) Skewness Kyrtosis
D. Descriptive statistics of bank CDS spreads - Period 2 (27 Oct 2011 - 30 May 2014)
GR_Banks 677 476.85 214.78 177.04 859.49 0.41 1.70
PT_Banks 677 322.84 172.93 85.83 799.67 0.78 2.65
IT_Banks 677 152.05 45.78 51.00 259.74 -0.35 2.52
SP_Banks 677 121.02 50.46 36.17 230.19 0.11 2.09
IR_Banks 677 551.54 340.55 163.99 1530.14 1.03 3.36
FR_Banks 677 58.61 23.50 21.57 118.19 0.44 2.29
NL_Banks 677 49.49 12.44 25.27 79.46 0.32 2.33
DE_Banks 677 35.78 12.44 17.82 80.19 0.75 2.61
AllBanks
(Weighted) 677 768.29 725.02 100.52 3560.48 1.11 3.59
AllBanks
(Unweighted) 677 221.02 103.64 72.80 471.13 0.55 2.24
Note:  GR, PT, IT, SP, IR, FR, NL, DE denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior unsecured
daily sovereign CDS premia, respectively and GR_Banks, PT_Banks, IT_Banks, SP_Banks, IR_Banks, FR_Banks, NL_Banks, DE_Banks denote
Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior unsecured daily bank CDS premia, respectively. AllCountries
(Weighted) denotes the weighted sovereign CDS spreads based on the annual gross domestic product for each country. AllBanks (Weighted) denotes
the weighted bank CDS spreads based on the annual total liabilities of each banking institution for each country. AllCountries (Unweighted) and
AllBanks (Unweighted) denote the unweighted sovereign and bank aggregate CDS series, respectively.
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PSI program is observed, recognizing riskiness is pervasive in the
derivatives market. CDS premia reached very high levels during the
third quarter of 2011, indicative of the market’s perception of disorderly
restructuring spilling into other credit markets.
A high degree of co-movement between Greek sovereign and bank
CDS series for the whole sample period is observed, albeit banking
sector CDS spreads do not rise as high as sovereign CDS. Irish banks
exhibit the highest CDS premia. In fact, they are higher than Irish
sovereign CDSs throughout the entire period. German and Dutch banks
exhibit the lowest CDS premia. The concurrent variation of the
sovereign and bank CDS spreads are indicative of the strong
interlinkages between government and bank credit risk. Most of CDS
series decrease during the second quarter of 2012 after the
implementation of PSI (completed on 25 April 2012).
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the sovereign and bank
CDS spreads in the sample. The spreads increase significantly during
the second subperiod, except for the sovereign spreads of Ireland,
Germany and Irish banks. The average sovereign CDS spread in the first
subperiod is 253bps, while in the second subperiod is 857bps, which is
mainly due to the surge of the Greek risk premium. The corresponding
averages, excluding Greece, are 161bps and 208bps. Aside from Greece,
sovereign CDS of Italy, Portugal and Spain are much higher in the
second period. The bank CDS spreads averages are 174bps and 221bps,
for the first and the second subperiod, respectively. Standard deviations
also increase in the second subperiod indicative of intensified volatility,
uncertainty and risk. In contrast, the standard deviations are lower for
Irish, Portuguese and Dutch banks during the second subperiod.
Pairwise correlations of sovereign and bank CDS spreads in
logarithmic first-differences show significant correlations, greater than
0.3 with the exception of Greece and Ireland during the second
subperiod.24 However, there is considerable reduction in the correlations
between CDS spreads during the second subperiod.
IV.  Methodology and empirical results
A. Stationarity and cointegration
The stationarity properties of the (log) level CDS series are examined
24. Correlation results are available from the authors upon request.
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applying the Phillips-Perron, Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (under the
unit root null) and for robustness, the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin test (under the stationarity null). All the series are found to be
non-stationary unit root processes. This is confirmed by testing the
first-differences of the log CDS series.
We test for cointegration between the non-stationary CDS series
applying the Johansen (1995) test for each subperiod.25 We recognize
that using a cointegration approach over a relatively short period may
entail some problems. Nevertheless, we believe it is justified given the
high-frequency data that are employed, in particular since the resulting
cointegrating relationships could be interpreted as reflecting systematic
temporary patterns.26 The number of lags in the VAR for the
cointegration test is selected using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). In the first subperiod, a significant cointegrating relationship is
observed between the sovereign and banking sector CDS of Greece,
Portugal, Spain and Ireland. There is also evidence of cointegration
between Greek sovereign and Portuguese bank CDS, and between the
weighted aggregate sovereign and bank CDS. In the second subperiod,
we find cointegrating relationships between Greek, Spanish, Irish
sovereign and bank CDS spreads, and between Greek sovereign and
Irish bank CDS series. Moreover, the sovereign CDS spreads of Greece
and the unweighted bank CDS are cointegrated in both subperiods.27 It
is observed that for the majority of CDS pairs there is no evidence of a
cointegrating relationship between them, in both subperiods. While this
implies absence of a common trend or risk factor driving the series,
there is still the possibility of temporal causal effects driven by
nonlinear dynamics.
B. Linear causality
Observed correlation between two CDS series under consideration does
not imply the existence of a causal relationship between them. As per
standard practice, we first study the causal relationship between CDS
series using the notion of Granger causality (1969) based on a time lag
25. Chen and Lin (2004) draw attention to the possibility that misleading conclusions
about causal relationships may be drawn if the cointegration relationships between the CDS
series are not accounted for in the causality test.
26. See Sander and Kleimeier (2003) who justify their approach on similar grounds.
27. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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TABLE 2. Linear Granger Causality Results
Raw Data Raw Data
Dependent Independent (p-value) (p-value)
Variable Variable Period 1 Period 2
A.
GR GR_Banks 0.0635* 0.1957
PT PT_Banks 0.1350 0.1466
IT IT_Banks 0.0243** 0.4990
SP SP_Banks 0.0005*** 0.0893*
IR IR_Banks 0.2925 0.0000***
FR FR_Banks 0.0005*** 0.0000***
NL NL_Banks 0.0064*** 0.2599
DE DE_Banks 0.0187** 0.3223
GR_Banks GR 0.0000*** 0.9638
PT_Banks PT 0.0000*** 0.0000***
IT_Banks IT 0.0001*** 0.0016***
SP_Banks SP 0.0000*** 0.0087***
IR_Banks IR 0.0869* 0.0512*
FR_Banks FR 0.0051*** 0.0001***
NL_Banks NL 0.0000*** 0.0030***
DE_Banks DE 0.0001*** 0.5322
B.
GR PT_Banks 0.0012*** 0.9843
GR IT_Banks 0.0165** 0.1272
GR SP_Banks 0.0006*** 0.0093***
GR IR_Banks 0.0246** 0.8240
GR FR_Banks 0.0609* 0.0058***
GR NL_Banks 0.0072*** 0.3585
GR DE_Banks 0.0004*** 0.3511
PT_Banks GR 0.0000*** 0.0115**
IT_Banks GR 0.0000*** 0.0344**
SP_Banks GR 0.0002*** 0.0841*
IR_Banks GR 0.0054*** 0.0028***
FR_Banks GR 0.0000*** 0.0235**
NL_Banks GR 0.0000*** 0.0287**
DE_Banks GR 0.0150** 0.0131**
( Continued )
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between cause and effect. The linear Granger causality tests are
performed within a VAR or VEC framework depending on the
stationarity properties of the underlying series and linear combination
thereof. If the series are non-stationary unit root processes and
cointegrated a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model is used to test for
causality, otherwise a VAR model in first-differences.28 The models are
estimated in each subperiod using the Johansen (1995) maximum
likelihood procedure, and are tested for autocorrelation. If there is
TABLE 2. (Continued)
Raw Data Raw Data
Dependent Independent (p-value) (p-value)
Variable Variable Period 1 Period 2
C.
AllCountries (Weighted) AllBanks (Weighted) 0.0312** 0.2185
AllCountries (Unweighted) AllBanks (Unweighted) 0.0724* 0.1259
GR AllBanks (Weighted) 0.0029*** 0.0374**
GR AllBanks (Unweighted) 0.0060*** 0.3603
AllBanks (Weighted) AllCountries (Weighted) 0.0001*** 0.2800
AllBanks (Unweighted) AllCountries (Unweighted) 0.0000*** 0.1451
AllBanks (Weighted) GR 0.0208** 0.0230**
AllBanks (Unweighted) GR 0.0016*** 0.3167
Note:  The table reports the p-values of the Granger causality test, using a VAR or VEC
model with raw data in Periods 1 and 2. The lag length of the models was determined by AIC.
The null hypothesis is that there is no Granger causality between the sovereign and bank CDS
spreads. Bold values indicate the pairs of sovereign and bank CDS series in which a
long-term relation is observed in each subperiod. *,**,*** denote rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. GR, PT, IT, SP, IR, FR,
NL, DE denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year
senior unsecured daily sovereign CDS premia, respectively and GR_Banks, PT_Banks,
IT_Banks, SP_Banks, IR_Banks, FR_Banks, NL_Banks, DE_Banks denote Greek,
Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior unsecured daily
bank CDS premia, respectively. AllCountries (Weighted) denotes the weighted sovereign
CDS spreads based on the annual gross domestic product for each country. AllBanks
(Weighted) denotes the weighted bank CDS spreads based on the annual total liabilities of
each banking institution for each country. AllCountries (Unweighted) and AllBanks
(Unweighted) denote the unweighted sovereign and bank aggregate CDS series, respectively.
28. We check the residuals of the VAR or VEC model, and if there are outliers greater
than 3 standard deviations, then a series of point dummy variables to capture specific
abnormal events during the period under study is included. The results are robust to a range
of threshold values between 2.5 and 3.5 standard deviations.
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autocorrelation, we increase the lag length of the VAR or VEC model.29
Table 2 summarizes the results of the linear Granger causality test
between banks and their sovereigns (Panel A), Greek sovereign CDS
and bank CDS (Panel B), and aggregate CDS series (Panel C). In the
first subperiod, before the PSI announcement, there is evidence of
strong bidirectional causal relationships for the majority of the CDS
pairs. Evidence of causality is weaker during the second subperiod,
especially causality running from banks to their sovereigns (see Panel
A) and from European banks to the Greek sovereign (see Panel B).
However, there is no evidence of weaker causality running from Greek
sovereign CDS to bank CDS in the post PSI period aside from some
differences in the degree of statistical significance (see Panel B). In the
majority of cases, causality is unidirectional in the second period. A
rather surprising result in this period is the absence of causality between
Greek sovereign and bank CDS. Causality is also weaker between the
aggregate CDS series in the second subperiod (see Panel C). Another
interesting result is that linear causality vanishes in most cases after
VAR/VEC filtering in both periods. We surmise nonlinear causality
effects may be present albeit not captured by linear causality tests.
We provide for robustness purposes a further test of causal changes
between the two periods using the Hsiao (1981) causality test, a
modified version of the Granger test, allowing more flexibility in the
choice of the dynamic lag structure. Based on the difference of FPEs
between the two periods, we infer a reduction in the magnitude of the
dynamic interlinkages between sovereign and bank default risk for most
CDS pairs.30
Impulse response and variance decomposition analysis are carried
out in cases, in which a causal relationship between the CDS series is
identified. Impulse response plots depict the responses of sovereign
CDS spreads, after a one standard deviation shock to the bank CDS
spreads, and vice versa, over a 10-day horizon.31 The overall results are
generally in agreement with the findings from the Granger causality
tests. Strong effects from sovereign CDS spreads to the corresponding
bank CDS spreads are found, both in the period before and after the PSI
29. If the VAR model is of p-order, the VECM should be of (p-1)-order.
30. The results of changes of causality based on Hsiao (1981) causality test are given in
table A1. The full set of results of the Hsiao causality test are available upon request.
Gomez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013) use a similar approach to test for Granger-causal
relationships among 10-year government bonds in 5 Eurozone countries.
31. The impulse response and variance decomposition results are available from the
authors upon request.
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program. In particular, we find stronger response of Greek, Irish,
Portuguese and Spanish bank CDS to their sovereign CDS in the first
subperiod, and Spanish bank CDS to sovereign CDS in the second
subperiod. These findings indicate that the linkages are stronger in
countries with weaker fiscal fundamentals. Conversely, the impact of
bank CDS on sovereign CDS is low, in most cases, especially in the
second subperiod. The impact on bank CDS after a shock to the
sovereign credit spreads of Greece is weaker during the second
subperiod. Lower persistence and magnitude in the effects of CDS
shocks are also found in the same subperiod.
Forecast error variance decomposition analysis shows that in the
first subperiod, the largest fraction of variability in all sovereign CDS
spreads is explained by their own shocks and only a small proportion by
bank CDS spreads. On the contrary, sovereign CDS spreads account for
a significant proportion of the variation in bank CDS. The results in the
second subperiod are similar albeit not as strong. There is no evidence
of strong influence from the sovereign CDS spreads of Greece to the
bank CDS spreads of the other countries, with the French bank CDS
spreads being the only exception.
C. Difference-in-Difference model
A difference-in-difference model is used to assess the robustness of the
empirical findings. For this purpose, a dummy variable, PSI, is defined,
which takes the value of zero for the period before the PSI
announcement and is equal to one otherwise. Specifically, the following
equation is estimated:
(1)0 1 2 3 4 1it it t itY d d PSI d INT d X d PSI Z u       
where X and Y denote pairs of bank and sovereign CDS series,   INT =
PSI ( ΔΧit  and Ζt is the residual of the long-run equation, assuming thatthe two series cointegrate, otherwise the error correction term is
omitted. The coefficient of the interaction variable (INT) is the main
parameter of interest since it reflects the change in the degree of
interaction between the two CDS series.
Consistent with the analysis thus far, the estimation results show that
in the majority of cases PSI has the effect of weakening the nexus
between the CDS series.32
32. The results are reported in table A2 in the appendix A.
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D. Nonlinear causality
The relationship between sovereign and bank CDS series varies during
crises periods, propagated by changes in the nexus between sovereigns
and banks. This implies that nonlinear interlinkages may arise between
sovereign and bank CDS, whereby the same change in fundamentals can
have a much larger impact on spreads than was the case previously (see
Delatte, Fouquau and Portes 2014). Heterogeneous market assessments
for a possible default may also induce nonlinearities in the causal
relationships between sovereign and bank CDS series by amplifying
sovereign risk. A linear model may fail to adequately capture a
nonlinear structure in the relationship among different variables, which
may lead to erroneous conclusions regarding spillover causal effects
among them (see Billio et al., 2012). For this reason, we turn next to
study nonlinear dynamics in the relationship between the CDS series.33
Diks and Panchenko non-parametric Granger causality test
The D&P (2006) test is a non-parametric nonlinear causality test. Under
the null hypothesis there is no causality from Xt to Yt for two strictlystationary time series (Xt, Yt, t$1), with finite lags lX and lY, (lX, lY, $1),formally stated as:
(2) 0 1 1: , ~X Y Yl l lt t t t tH Y X Y Y Y 
where  and  are lagged 1, ,X Xlt t l tX X X    1, ,Y Ylt t l tY Y Y  vectors. The null hypothesis is rejected, when current and past
information of contributes to better prediction of .XltX 1tY D&P test nonlinear causal spillover effects by considering the joint
and marginal distributions of the (lX + lY + 1) dimensional stationaryvector  where , which under the null yield , ,X Yl lt t t tW X Y Z 1t tZ Y the following statistic:
(3)         , ,, , , , , , 0Y X Y Y ZX Y Zq E f X Y Z f Y f X Y f Y Z    
33. Preliminary analysis confirms possible nonlinear dependence in the data. The BDS
test rejects the null of linear dependence in the raw as well as VAR or VEC- filtered series.
However, for GARCH-BEKK (1,1) filtered series, in the majority of cases the BDS statistic
is not statistically significant. Results are available upon request.
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where f(.) denote the associated joint and marginal densities. Defining alocal  square  kernel  density  estimator  of  a  dW-variate  random wˆ if W
vector   W   at   Wi   such   that:  ,   where    ,2ˆ 1
Wd
Wn
w i ijj j i
e
f W I
n

  , Ι(.): is the indicator function,  is the maximum Wij i j nI I W W    .
norm and εn is the bandwidth, D&P show that the test statistic reducesto:
(4)
        
   
, ,
, ,
1 ˆ ˆ, ,2
ˆ ˆ, ,
n X Y Z i i i Y ii
X Y i i Y Z i i
n
T f X Y Z f Y
n n
f X Y f Y Z
  


For lX = lY = 1,  and, if the bandwidth is calculated as εn = Cn–β (where
n is the sample size, C>0, and ), D&P (2006) show that the1 1,4 3
   distribution of the test statistic given by (4) converges to the standard
normal distribution under the null given by:34
(5)    0,1dn n
n
T q
n N
S
  
where  denotes convergence in distribution and Sn(.) is andestimator of the asymptotic variance of Tn(.) (D&P, 2006, Bekiros andDiks, 2008).
Table 3 presents the results of the D&P nonlinear causality test for
the CDS series with the number of lags set at lx=ly=1,2,3,4,5,6.35,36 In thefirst subperiod, there is strong evidence of bidirectional nonlinear causal
34. According to D&P (2006), when the local bias tends to zero at a rate of ε2, then the
optimal bandwidth that gives the Tn estimator with the smallest mean-squared-error iscalculated based on εn = Cn–2/7, where β = 2/7 is the optimal rate. Since unrealistically largevalues of the bandwidth may arise in small samples, based on the optimal value of C, D&P
suggest the choice of bandwidth should be truncated by εn = max (Cn–2/7, 1.5).
35. Following Bekiros and Diks (2008), we set the constant term C* equal to 7.5 and the
optimal bandwidths at 1.14 for the first period and 1.17 for the second period. For robustness,
the D&P test is performed for different bandwidths with no noticeable effects on the results.
36. The causal relations are significant at lower lags lx= ly, in the range of 1 to 6. Forlarger lag lengths, the causal effects between the series vanish.
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TABLE 3. Nonlinear D&P Granger Causality Results in Raw Return Data
Period 1
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
A.
GR GR_Banks 0.0000*** 0.0022*** 0.0099*** 0.0083*** 0.0116** 0.0389**
PT PT_Banks 0.0000*** 0.0004*** 0.0094*** 0.0382** 0.0376** 0.1044
IT IT_Banks 0.0051*** 0.0344** 0.0106** 0.0273** 0.0609* 0.1542
SP SP_Banks 0.0138** 0.0101** 0.0061*** 0.0354** 0.2992 0.3978
IR IR_Banks 0.4631 0.1746 0.7089 0.8666 0.7220 0.8404
FR FR_Banks 0.0280** 0.0101** 0.0213** 0.0236** 0.0227** 0.0437**
NL NL_Banks 0.0102** 0.0217** 0.0537* 0.0777* 0.1213 0.0815*
DE DE_Banks 0.0104** 0.0002*** 0.0057*** 0.0346** 0.0507* 0.0455**
GR_Banks GR 0.0069*** 0.1130 0.5237 0.5707 0.9485 0.9720
PT_Banks PT 0.0021*** 0.0002*** 0.0012*** 0.0048*** 0.0233** 0.0493**
IT_Banks IT 0.0554* 0.0734* 0.0252** 0.0852* 0.1582 0.3811
SP_Banks SP 0.0050*** 0.0003*** 0.0012*** 0.0094*** 0.0288** 0.0598*
IR_Banks IR 0.6199 0.4956 0.4761 0.5245 0.7991 0.7916
FR_Banks FR 0.0016*** 0.0019*** 0.0358** 0.0752* 0.2094 0.1821
NL_Banks NL 0.0556* 0.0524** 0.2923 0.4755 0.5250 0.7409
DE_Banks DE 0.0034*** 0.0037*** 0.0019*** 0.0051*** 0.0106** 0.1507
( Continued )
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TABLE 3. (Continued)
Period 1
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
B.
GR PT_Banks 0.0002*** 0.0017*** 0.0093*** 0.0300** 0.0396** 0.0740*
GR IT_Banks 0.0014*** 0.0011*** 0.0065*** 0.0176** 0.0436** 0.0965*
GR SP_Banks 0.0197** 0.0400** 0.1966 0.3159 0.3451 0.2465
GR IR_Banks 0.3446 0.1915 0.6836 0.5715 0.5009 0.5274
GR FR_Banks 0.0130** 0.0187** 0.0603* 0.0699* 0.0516* 0.1808
GR NL_Banks 0.0008*** 0.0010*** 0.0056*** 0.0052*** 0.0175** 0.0220**
GR DE_Banks 0.0301** 0.0060*** 0.0454** 0.2464 0.2578 0.3843
PT_Banks GR 0.0480** 0.0410** 0.0899* 0.0734* 0.4331 0.7544
IT_Banks GR 0.0213** 0.0111** 0.0108** 0.0378** 0.2839 0.4187
SP_Banks GR 0.0762* 0.0479*** 0.0184** 0.0239** 0.1021 0.2361
IR_Banks GR 0.9217 0.4991 0.5702 0.7167 0.7947 0.8395
FR_Banks GR 0.0869* 0.0719* 0.2304 0.2495 0.4196 0.2716
NL_Banks GR 0.1109 0.1540 0.1156 0.0683* 0.1471 0.2816
DE_Banks GR 0.1062 0.0640* 0.2240 0.1504 0.3952 0.3681
( Continued )
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TABLE 3. (Continued)
Period 1
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
C.
AllCountries AllBanks
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.0009*** 0.0036*** 0.0069*** 0.0260** 0.0981* 0.1906
AllCountries AllBanks
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.0314** 0.0517* 0.1577 0.2405 0.2435 0.3668
AllBanks
GR (Weighted) 0.0066*** 0.0092*** 0.0441** 0.0857* 0.1128 0.2975
AllBanks
GR (Unweighted) 0.0185** 0.0206** 0.1069 0.0917 0.2336 0.4103
AllBanks  AllCountries
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.0675* 0.0140** 0.0347** 0.0454 0.2617 0.2347
AllBanks  AllCountries
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.7927 0.5979 0.4016 0.3731 0.7286 0.7742
AllBanks
(Weighted) GR 0.1794 0.0612* 0.1945 0.2878 0.5204 0.5975
AllBanks
(Unweighted) GR 0.4885 0.2319 0.3671 0.5378 0.7874 0.8874
( Continued )
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TABLE 3. (Continued)
Period 2
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
A.
GR GR_Banks 0.2383 0.2798 0.1905 0.1391 0.1401 0.1543
PT PT_Banks 0.5467 0.8285 0.9686 0.7497 0.6264 0.5632
IT IT_Banks 0.47068 0.0309** 0.0170** 0.0464** 0.1093 0.1730
SP SP_Banks 0.0127** 0.0537* 0.1411 0.2737 0.5438 0.6041
IR IR_Banks 0.5793 0.1843 0.3133 0.2333 0.1826 0.2020
FR FR_Banks 0.0027*** 0.0025*** 0.0148** 0.0783* 0.0877* 0.2091
NL NL_Banks 0.0215** 0.0820* 0.0994* 0.2425 0.4568 0.3191
DE DE_Banks 0.1310 0.1161 0.3063 0.4271 0.3197 0.4601
GR_Banks GR 0.3448 0.1078 0.3326 0.1091 0.0531* 0.0665*
PT_Banks PT 0.0216** 0.2118 0.3685 0.6087 0.4171 0.4455
IT_Banks IT 0.0154** 0.1361 0.1794 0.4643 0.1696 0.2199
SP_Banks SP 0.0404** 0.1295 0.2464 0.2973 0.2031 0.2841
IR_Banks IR 0.9561 0.9294 0.9644 0.2573 0.3309 0.4757
FR_Banks FR 0.0005*** 0.0101** 0.0982* 0.0457** 0.1061 0.6556
NL_Banks NL 0.9357 0.5441 0.3034 0.8148 0.8073 0.8310
DE_Banks DE 0.0366** 0.3273 0.6935 0.1706 0.0885* 0.0340**
( Continued )
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TABLE 3. (Continued)
Period 2
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
B.
GR PT_Banks 0.0668*  0.1942 0.4256 0.6378 0.3809 0.3515
GR IT_Banks 0.0845*  0.1311 0.1481    0.0817* 0.1358 0.1941
GR SP_Banks 0.0887*  0.1679 0.0493** 0.1016 0.1648 0.1463
GR IR_Banks 0.1469 0.6871 0.9849 0.9538 0.5464  0.5288
GR FR_Banks 0.0330**  0.0051*** 0.0170** 0.0187** 0.0136**     0.0747*
GR NL_Banks 0.4208 0.6325 0.4486 0.4403 0.4578 0.5796
GR DE_Banks 0.3041 0.2323 0.5456 0.5183 0.7978 0.8797
PT_Banks GR 0.0708* 0.1670 0.6344 0.8280 0.8556 0.8295
IT_Banks GR 0.1981 0.3395 0.2261 0.4571 0.5312 0.7230
SP_Banks GR 0.0257** 0.1531  0.0656* 0.1545 0.1450 0.4425
IR_Banks GR 0.7980 0.3800 0.2301 0.0949* 0.1227 0.1826
FR_Banks GR 0.001*** 0.0008*** 0.0012*** 0.0162** 0.0103** 0.0220**
NL_Banks GR 0.6542 0.9192 0.8781 0.8957 0.5453  0.7305
DE_Banks GR 0.0112** 0.0883* 0.2000 0.3080 0.2273  0.4764
( Continued )
243
T
h
e
 E
ffe
c
t o
f th
e
 P
S
I in
 th
e
 R
e
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 B
e
tw
e
e
n
 S
o
v
e
re
ig
n
 a
n
d
 B
a
n
k
 C
re
d
it R
isk
TABLE 3. (Continued)
Period 2
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
C.
AllCountries AllBanks
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.0427** 0.0693* 0.0646 0.0865* 0.3120 0.6213
AllCountries AllBanks
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.0328** 0.0843* 0.1078 0.3647 0.2163 0.2688
AllBanks
GR (Weighted) 0.0619* 0.0755* 0.0539* 0.0312** 0.0763* 0.3258
AllBanks
GR (Unweighted) 0.5435 0.2443 0.5266 0.3571 0.2856 0.5287
AllBanks AllCountries 
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.0195** 0.0343** 0.0056*** 0.0181** 0.0637* 0.1315
AllBanks AllCountries
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.0498** 0.0254** 0.0160** 0.0284** 0.0590*  0.0101**
AllBanks
(Weighted) GR 0.0197** 0.0234** 0.0268** 0.0793* 0.0468** 0.1823
AllBanks
(Unweighted) GR 0.5274 0.1953 0.1610 0.1780 0.1260 0.1579
( Continued )
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TABLE 3. (Continued)
Note:  The table reports p-values of the nonlinear D&P Granger causality test on the raw return data for lags lX = lY = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. We testthe null hypothesis that there is no Granger causality between the sovereign and bank CDS spreads. *,**,*** denote rejection of the null hypothesis
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. GR, PT, IT, SP, IR, FR, NL, DE denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French,
Dutch and German 5-year senior unsecured daily sovereign CDS premia, respectively and GR_Banks, PT_Banks, IT_Banks, SP_Banks, IR_Banks,
FR_Banks, NL_Banks, DE_Banks denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior unsecured daily bank
CDS premia, respectively. AllCountries (Weighted) denotes the weighted sovereign CDS spreads based on the annual gross domestic product for
each country. AllBanks (Weighted) denotes the weighted bank CDS spreads based on the annual total liabilities of each banking institution for each
country. AllCountries (Unweighted) and AllBanks (Unweighted) denote the unweighted sovereign and bank aggregate CDS series, respectively.
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effects for the majority of the pairs of CDS series. There is no evidence
of causality between the sovereign and bank CDS spreads of Ireland
(see Panel A), and between the Irish bank CDS spreads and sovereign
credit spreads of Greece (see Panel B).
In the second subperiod, the results show weaker nonlinear causal
relationships albeit their number is greater than those reported in table
2 above. There is also stronger evidence of bidirectional causality in
comparison to the results of table 2, especially in the relationship
between Greek sovereign CDS and European bank CDS (see Panel B). 
We also investigate nonlinear causal relationships between the series
by re-applying the D&P (2006) test to the estimated residual series that
are obtained from the VAR or VEC models. Using VAR or VEC
filtered residuals helps us identify whether the effects shown in table 3
above are strictly driven by nonlinear causality.37 A decrease in the
number of causal relationships after first moment filtering is observed.
The change is more notable for the CDS between banks and their
sovereigns (see Panel A) in the first subperiod, and between the
sovereign CDS of Greece and European bank CDS in the second period
(see Panel B). These findings suggest that nonlinear dynamics are less
likely to dominate the nexus between sovereign and bank CDS spreads
in the second subperiod.
A bivariate diagonal GARCH-BEKK (1,1) model
H&J (1994) and D&P (2005) among others, stress the importance of
filtering out autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, when
examining potential nonlinear relationships between time series.
Conditional heteroskedasticity could bias causality tests adversely
affecting their power.38,39 This is because volatility effects may in part
or in whole account for nonlinear causal linkages between series.40 A
37. These results are reported in table A3 in the appendix A.
38. D&P (2006) provide evidence that the results of the Baek and Brock (1992) test
could be biased because of the existence of conditional heteroskedacity in the data.
39. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) contend that correlation coefficient tests for contagion
are biased upward during a crisis because of the presence of heteroskedasticity in market
returns. The authors assume that there are no endogeneity and omitted variables issues in
order to adjust the tests for this bias. After the adjustments for heteroskedasticity they
conclude that there was not contagion during specific crisis periods but only interdependence.
These findings are in line with those of Pericoli and Sbracia (2003).
40. Many financial series are characterized by time-varying conditional variance
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second moment filtering using a bivariate diagonal GARCH-BEKK
(1,1) model is performed.
The Engle and Kroner (1995) GARCH-BEKK (p, q, K) model is
defined as:
(6)1 1 1 1
K q K p
t ik t i t i ik ik t i ikk j k i
H C C A u u A B H B             
where C is an (N×N) upper triangular matrix, A is an (N×N) matrix of
parameters specifying the relation between the current conditional
variance and lagged squared errors, B is an (N×N) matrix of parameters,
with its diagonal elements specifying the impact of past conditional
variances on current conditional variances, ut is the vector ofdisturbances, while Ht is the conditional variance-covariance matrix ofthe error terms at time t, which is assumed to be positive definite. The
other elements of the matrices A and B specify the corresponding
cross-market effects on the conditional variance and covariance. N is the
number of variables in the model (N=2 in our model).
For simplicity, it is assumed that K=1, as per standard practice in
empirical research. In this case, the BEKK (p, q, 1) model is defined as:
(7)1 1
q p
t i t i t i i i t i ii i
H C C Au u A B H B         
Thus, the GARCH-BEKK (1, 1, 1) model can be written as follows:
(8)1 1 1 1 1 1t t t i tH C C Au u A B H B       
A diagonal GARCH-BEKK model, with diagonal matrices A and B, is
applied. The results of the D&P nonlinear causality test after
GARCH-BEKK filtering are shown in table 4.41 The persistence and
significance of nonlinear causal relationships are lower than those
reported previously. This reduction corroborates the presence of
exhibiting clustering, especially series measured at higher frequencies. Using daily data on
sovereign and bank CDS spreads, it is prudent that we control for GARCH effects.
41. There is a possibility of higher-order conditional moments between the CDS series,
if nonlinear causal effects persist after GARCH-BEKK filtering.
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TABLE 4. Nonlinear D&P Granger Causality Results for GARCH-BEKK- Filtered Data
Period 1
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
A.
GR GR_Banks 0.0459** 0.0721* 0.0397** 0.0202** 0.0174** 0.0490**
PT PT_Banks 0.0009*** 0.0062*** 0.0576* 0.1265 0.3103 0.0993*
IT IT_Banks 0.1326 0.2658 0.2529 0.3180 0.3243 0.3961
SP SP_Banks 0.0322** 0.0413** 0.0731* 0.2730 0.6959 0.6717
IR IR_Banks 0.6546  0.4523 0.9430 0.7930 0.8335 0.8536
FR FR_Banks 0.1781  0.1431 0.1922 0.3960 0.3858 0.5378
NL NL_Banks 0.0559*  0.1068 0.0468** 0.1079 0.1846 0.2189
DE DE_Banks 0.4692 0.0165** 0.0202** 0.0445** 0.0417** 0.0656*
GR_Banks GR 0.0281** 0.1281 0.4164 0.3497 0.7253 0.7788
PT_Banks PT 0.2802 0.1507 0.0997* 0.0645* 0.1375 0.2528
IT_Banks IT 0.4775 0.3997 0.6127 0.8166 0.5829 0.5166
SP_Banks SP 0.1970 0.2061 0.1539 0.4697 0.1202 0.1960
IR_Banks IR 0.7497 0.4490 0.3924 0.2452 0.3663 0.4482
FR_Banks FR 0.7494 0.4287 0.5607 0.8133 0.7064 0.5447
NL_Banks NL 0.4702 0.6822 0.4885 0.7779 0.8429 0.8973
DE_Banks DE 0.2209 0.1772 0.0875* 0.2151 0.4671 0.5912
( Continued )
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TABLE 4. (Continued)
Period 1
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
B.
GR PT_Banks 0.1448 0.5692 0.2415 0.0875* 0.2614 0.4062
GR IT_Banks 0.7086 0.2000 0.0314** 0.1182 0.2536 0.5066
GR SP_Banks 0.2970 0.2185 0.3055 0.3876 0.5471 0.5519
GR IR_Banks 0.6792 0.6436 0.8663 0.7561 0.2984 0.1050
GR FR_Banks 0.2025 0.2329 0.1307 0.2649 0.5270 0.7944
GR NL_Banks 0.8240 0.2694 0.1417 0.1027 0.0606* 0.0645*
GR DE_Banks 0.6507 0.3324 0.7139 0.7581 0.9774 0.9319
PT_Banks GR 0.0462** 0.3608 0.1476 0.1454 0.3467 0.5471
IT_Banks GR 0.2498 0.4085 0.6327 0.6744 0.2940 0.2388
SP_Banks GR 0.0570* 0.1652 0.0965 0.1100 0.1612 0.2347
IR_Banks GR 0.8514 0.6550 0.5159 0.3689 0.6155 0.5276
FR_Banks GR 0.1667 0.6730 0.6127 0.6798 0.5297 0.3754
NL_Banks GR 0.1994 0.2175 0.5757 0.6485 0.6582 0.4959
DE_Banks GR 0.0423** 0.1220 0.1223 0.0665* 0.1634 0.0516*
( Continued )
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TABLE 4. (Continued)
Period 1
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
C.
AllCountries AllBanks
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.0482** 0.1109 0.4805 0.9273 0.7479 0.6586
AllCountries AllBanks
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.1422 0.2575 0.6659 0.2570 0.1737 0.1463
AllBanks
GR (Weighted) 0.3839 0.2478 0.5199 0.4172 0.8803 0.9754
AllBanks
GR (Unweighted) 0.1020 0.1571 0.5022 0.0836* 0.3023 0.2627
AllBanks AllCountries
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.8245 0.6728 0.6681 0.2779 0.3566 0.2938
AllBanks AllCountries
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.8727 0.6261 0.4150 0.3080 0.5724 0.5258
AllBanks
(Weighted) GR 0.1001 0.3051 0.5739 0.4780 0.2697 0.4896
AllBanks
(Unweighted) GR 0.1985 0.1035 0.0614* 0.0872* 0.2782 0.4853
( Continued )
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TABLE 4. (Continued)
Period 2
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
A.
GR GR_Banks 0.7368 0.8375 0.8616 0.8522 0.7907 0.8705
PT PT_Banks 0.9395 0.9620 0.9757 0.7208 0.7757 0.8407
IT IT_Banks 0.5885 0.1314 0.1873 0.3293 0.5756 0.8936
SP SP_Banks 0.6726 0.4447 0.4925 0.5574 0.7794 0.7519
IR IR_Banks 0.7880 0.6953 0.3753 0.5059 0.6006 0.7916
FR FR_Banks 0.7200 0.4435 0.4211 0.6523 0.8592 0.8234
NL NL_Banks 0.2153 0.4520 0.4833 0.8227 0.7066 0.7870
DE DE_Banks 0.3779 0.0799*** 0.0654* 0.2239 0.7844 0.7619
GR_Banks GR 0.4248 0.2245 0.4811 0.5615 0.2911 0.5002
PT_Banks PT 0.2320 0.4665 0.5260 0.6258 0.6468 0.6040
IT_Banks IT 0.2878 0.2800 0.6609 0.9374 0.7012 0.7363
SP_Banks SP 0.2323 0.2201 0.7894 0.9177 0.8413 0.8211
IR_Banks IR 0.4150 0.5529 0.5651 0.2963 0.1785 0.3327
FR_Banks FR 0.5462 0.3448 0.1673 0.0561* 0.3072 0.2838
NL_Banks NL 0.2823 0.4399 0.1474 0.6361 0.6772 0.3651
DE_Banks DE 0.0079* 0.2157 0.4494 0.5990 0.0997* 0.0300**
( Continued )
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TABLE 4. (Continued)
Period 2
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
B.
GR PT_Banks 0.0199** 0.0390** 0.1377 0.0764* 0.1443 0.3700
GR IT_Banks 0.0521*** 0.0819*** 0.0788* 0.0316** 0.0302** 0.0721*
GR SP_Banks 0.0812*** 0.0643*** 0.0109** 0.0495** 0.0625* 0.1622
GR FR_Banks 0.0477** 0.0935*** 0.1908 0.2846 0.1195 0.1510
GR IR_Banks 0.7090 0.7320 0.3804 0.4771 0.5856 0.8183
GR NL_Banks 0.5840 0.3326 0.2487 0.5743 0.4062 0.4718
GR DE_Banks 0.3899  0.0188** 0.1190 0.2768 0.6405 0.8331
PT_Banks GR 0.0739*** 0.1976 0.2932 0.3215 0.1542 0.1280
IT_Banks GR 0.2847 0.4354 0.2041 0.3590 0.7022 0.6334
SP_Banks GR 0.3942 0.2569 0.0920* 0.0720* 0.0702* 0.3502
FR_Banks GR 0.1115 0.3782 0.1179 0.2185 0.3942 0.3671
IR_Banks GR 0.2542 0.5440 0.5566 0.3420 0.3131 0.5044
NL_Banks GR 0.1372 0.1894 0.1109 0.1332 0.1436 0.1806
DE_Banks GR 0.1840 0.2804 0.2731 0.7626 0.8636 0.8814
( Continued )
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TABLE 4. (Continued)
Period 2
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
C.
AllCountries AllBanks
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.1561 0.3071 0.1766 0.3196 0.3561 0.4502
AllCountries AllBanks
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.7640 0.1499 0.2189 0.5706 0.6227 0.7688
AllBanks
GR (Weighted) 0.0901*** 0.1326 0.1830 0.3980 0.3470 0.5038
AllBanks
GR (Unweighted) 0.2224 0.4393 0.5285 0.4971 0.6715 0.5230
AllBanks AllCountries 
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.3374 0.4986 0.1645 0.4045 0.2970 0.6556
AllBanks AllCountries
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.7095 0.9348 0.0497** 0.0470** 0.0879* 0.0307**
AllBanks
(Weighted) GR 0.1016 0.3706 0.0835* 0.1087 0.1302 0.2704
AllBanks
(Unweighted) GR 0.3760 0.6330 0.2161 0.3342 0.5023 0.7713
( Continued )
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TABLE 4. (Continued)
Note:  The table reports p-values of the nonlinear D&P Granger causality test on the GARCH-BEKK filtered data for lags lX = lY = 1, 2, 3, 4,5, 6. We test the null hypothesis that there is no Granger causality between the sovereign and bank CDS spreads. *,**,*** denote rejection of the
null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. GR, PT, IT, SP, IR, FR, NL, DE denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish,
Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior unsecured daily sovereign CDS premia, respectively and GR_Banks, PT_Banks, IT_Banks,
SP_Banks, IR_Banks, FR_Banks, NL_Banks, DE_Banks denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior
unsecured daily bank CDS premia, respectively. AllCountries (Weighted) denotes the weighted sovereign CDS spreads based on the annual gross
domestic product for each country. AllBanks (Weighted) denotes the weighted bank CDS spreads based on the annual total liabilities of each
banking institution for each country. AllCountries (Unweighted) and AllBanks (Unweighted) denote the unweighted sovereign and bank aggregate
CDS series, respectively.
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volatility spillover effects.42 Specifically, in the first subperiod, the
results show persistent causal effects in the direction from Greek,
Portuguese and German bank CDS to the corresponding sovereign CDS
spreads. In addition, there are shorter duration unilateral causal
relationships from Spanish and Dutch bank CDS spreads to the
sovereign CDS of Spain and the Netherlands. There is also weak
evidence of causality running from Greek sovereign CDS spreads to
Greek, Portuguese, Spanish, German and unweighted bank CDS
spreads.
In the second subperiod, there is evidence for the existence of
bidirectional causal interlinkages between German sovereign and bank
CDS spreads, Greek sovereign and Spanish and Portuguese bank CDS.
There are also causal effects from French and German bank CDS to the
sovereign CDS spreads of Greece at short lag, and more persistent
causal effects from Italian bank CDS spreads to Greek sovereign CDS.
The sovereign credit spreads of Greece have weak causal effects on the
weighted bank CDS, while the unweighted sovereign CDS spreads have
significant explanatory power for predicting the respective bank CDS.
Overall the results of table 4 show that volatility effects and
spillovers are occurring mainly in Panel A, namely in the CDS spreads
between banks and their sovereigns. On the other hand, the results in
Panels B and C indicate that nonlinear causal effects persist after
GARCH filtering in both periods, suggesting that volatility spillovers
are less like to induce nonlinear causality.43
42. Some of the notable differences are as follows: There is no longer evidence of
bidirectional causality between Spanish, French and German bank and sovereign CDS after
GARCH-BEKK filtering in the first subperiod albeit unidirectional causality from German
and Spanish bank CDS to their sovereign CDS is maintained. There is also no evidence of
causality running from Italian bank to sovereign CDS, and from Greek sovereign CDS to
German and Italian bank CDS. In the second subperiod, there is no evidence of unidirectional
causality from Dutch and French bank CDS to their sovereign CDS, and from Greek and
Italian sovereign CDS to the corresponding bank CDS, after GARCH-BEKK filtering.
43. We re-run the linear and nonlinear causality tests by using the aggregate European
Monetary Union 5-year CDS-sovereign index published by Thomson Financial Datastream
(Datastream code: DSESV5E) and the corresponding CDS-banking index (Datastream code:
DSEBK5E). The results are generally in line with the previous findings supporting the
robustness of our conclusions. These results are available upon request.
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V.  Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the changing dynamics characterizing
the nexus between sovereign and bank credit risk around an important
event during the European sovereign debt crisis, specifically the period
before and after the announcement of PSI. The results show that there
were significant bidirectional causal interlinkages between sovereign
and bank credit risk in the period before PSI, especially from sovereign
credit spreads to the corresponding banking sector credit spreads. The
dynamic interlinkages between banks and sovereigns in terms of
magnitude and persistence weakened after PSI, and this result holds
consistently across a step-by-step procedure involving linear causality
and nonlinear causality tests both in terms of raw and filtered data. We
surmise this evidence supports the view that PSI was successful in
weakening the nexus between banks and sovereigns, and in this sense,
it may be viewed as a positive outcome.
In the case of Greece, the results show bidirectional causality
between banks and their sovereign in the first period but surprisingly
little evidence of causality in the second period aside from some weak
evidence of nonlinear causality at longer lags. We surmise this evidence
is consistent with an important element in the PSI providing Greek
banks full recovery through recapitalization for portfolio losses suffered
as a result of the PSI haircut, thereby preventing country-specific risk
turning into a systemic risk. Additionally, the results suggest that strong
causal effects running from Greek sovereign CDS to bank CDS of other
Eurozone countries in the period before PSI appears to have been
greatly subdued in the following subperiod.
The extension of causality testing to a nonlinear framework captures
more efficiently the unpredictable and abnormal variations in CDS
markets that occurred under the crisis conditions. More specifically, the
D&P (2006) Granger causality test provides significant evidence of
nonlinear causal relationship between sovereign and bank CDS series.
The D&P test results indicated additional Granger causal relationships
that were not evident from linear causality tests, specifically for
Portuguese banks on their sovereign in the first period, Italian banks on
their sovereign and Greek sovereign on Greek banks in the second
period. Additionally, whilst most linear causal relationships vanished
after VAR/VEC filtering, nonlinear causal linkages were still present
and more importantly persisted after multivariate GARCH filtering
during both periods.
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European banks had significant albeit varying exposures to Greek
sovereign debt, with the effectiveness of the PSI program resting in its
ability to balance these risks while delivering a positive outcome in
terms of placing Greek sovereign debt on a more sustainable path.
Hence, the success of the program rested on its ability to raise investor
confidence allowing Greece to access again the international financial
markets, while mitigating the transmission of the Greek sovereign crisis
to the rest of the Eurozone. The findings of this study are important
since widely held views at the time were very pessimistic about the
outcome of the program. Greece was able to access capital markets
again with small issues totaling euro 4.5 billion in 2014 paving the way
for a return to the debt markets of its banks and corporates but such
progress was short lived. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said
that the beneficial effects of the program did not prove to be long lasting
but this was more a reflection of continuing economic depression driven
by extreme fiscal austerity.
In Cyprus big banks attracted large overseas deposits, mainly from
Russia, and invested heavily in Greek sovereign bonds. While exposure
to Greece made Cyprus more vulnerable, the economy was already
under pressure owing to a significant deterioration of public finances,
damage to investor confidence, with the country losing access to
international capital markets as early as May 2011. A promising avenue
for future research is implementating our methodological approach to
the analysis of credit risk interdependence between Greece and Cyprus
using alternative proxy variables for bank credit risk. This analysis
could shed more light on the dynamics of the risk transfer mechanism
in the broader context of developments in Cyprus at the time. Lessons
in turn from the experience of both Cyprus and Greece raise questions
about what other initiatives may be undertaken by European regulatory
authorities aiming at containing the strong nexus between sovereigns
and banks, and what the appropriate response should be to a crisis.  Part
of the question is a broader assessment of the costs and benefits of
capital controls or the bail-in of unsecured depositors within the
parameters defining a multi-faceted response to a crisis.
Accepted by:  Prof. P. Theodossiou, PhD, Editor-in-Chief , November 2019
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Appendix A
TABLE A1. Change of Causality based on Hsiao Causality Test
Response Control 1st period 2nd period
variable variable FPE (k,0)-FPE (k, l) FPE (k,0)-FPE (k, l) Causality
A.
FR FR_Banks 0.00002691 0.00007301 8
DE DE_Banks 0.00002796 0.00000021 9
PT_Banks PT 0.00007541 0.00000959 9
IT_Banks IT 0.00005739 0.00000810 9
SP_Banks SP 0.00003345 0.00000654 9
IR_Banks IR 0.00002528 0.00000192 9
FR_Banks FR 0.00001503 0.00000962 9
NL_Banks NL 0.00001832 0.00000499 9
B.
GR IT_Banks 0.00002362 0.00005000 8
GR SP_Banks 0.00002969 0.00000129 9
GR IR_Banks 0.00000499 0.00000216 9
GR FR_Banks 0.00000852 0.00008544 8
GR NL_Banks 0.00002291 0.00000682 9
GR DE_Banks 0.00002962 0.00004581 8
PT_Banks GR 0.00007095 0.00000304 9
IT_Banks GR 0.00007024 0.00000386 9
SP_Banks GR 0.00002901 0.00000152 9
IR_Banks GR 0.00001812 0.00000549 9
FR_Banks GR 0.00003259 0.00000906 9
NL_Banks GR 0.00002772 0.00000013 9
DE_Banks GR 0.00001860 0.00000151 9
C.
AllCountries AllBanks
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.00000492 0.00001347 8
AllCountries AllBanks
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.00000303 0.00002522 8
AllBanks
GR (Weighted) 0.00002391 0.00003406 8
AllBanks AllCountries
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.00001541 0.00000003 9
AllBanks
(Weighted) GR 0.00002028 0.00000048 9
AllBanks
(Unweighted) GR 0.00002647 0.00000085 9
( Continued )
Multinational Finance Journal258
TABLE A1. (Continued)
Note:  This table presents the changes in causality for the CDS time series, for which
there is a causal relationship in both subperiods. Period 1 ranges from 1 Jan 2009 to 26 Oct
2011 and period 2 from 27 Oct 2011 to 30 May 2014. FPE is final prediction error. GR, PT,
IT, SP, IR, FR, NL, DE denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and
German 5-year senior unsecured daily sovereign CDS premia, respectively and GR_Banks,
PT_Banks, IT_Banks, SP_Banks, IR_Banks, FR_Banks, NL_Banks, DE_Banks denote
Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior unsecured
daily bank CDS premia, respectively. AllCountries (Weighted) denotes the weighted
sovereign CDS spreads based on the annual gross domestic product for each country.
AllBanks (Weighted) denotes the weighted bank CDS spreads based on the annual total
liabilities of each banking institution for each country. AllCountries (Unweighted) and
AllBanks (Unweighted) denote the unweighted sovereign and bank aggregate CDS series,
respectively.
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TABLE A2. Difference-in-Difference Results
Response variable Control variable Coefficient of ΙNT Causality
A.
–0.4523***
GR GR_Banks (p=0.0015) 9
–0.4510***
PT PT_Banks (p=0.0000) 9
–0.0680
IT IT_Banks (p=0.2892) -
–0.2451***
SP SP_Banks (p=0.0005) 9
–0.0991
IR IR_Banks (p=0.2318) -
0.0022
FR FR_Banks (p=0.9706) -
–0.1808***
NL NL_Banks (p=0.0040) 9
–0.2196***
DE DE_Banks (p=0.0064) 9
–0.1429***
GR_Banks GR (p=0.0000) 9
–0.1781***
PT_Banks PT (p=0.0000) 9
–0.0079
IT_Banks IT (p=0.8077) -
–0.0145
SP_Banks SP (p=0.6128) -
–0.2127***
IR_Banks IR (p=0.0000) 9
–0.1517***
FR_Banks FR (p=0.0000) 9
0.0305
NL_Banks NL (p=0.4818) -
–0.1004***
DE_Banks DE (p=0.0008) 9
B.
0.6042***
GR PT_Banks (p=0.0000) 8
–0.1901**
GR IT_Banks (p=0.0384) 9
–0.3738***
GR SP_Banks (p=0.0002) 9
( Continued )
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TABLE A2. (Continued)
Response variable Control variable Coefficient of ΙNT Causality
B.
–0.3363***
GR IR_Banks (p=0.0054) 9
–0.2330***
GR FR_Banks (p=0.0053) 9
–0.2600**
GR NL_Banks (p=0.0140) 9
–0.266249***
GR DE_Banks (p=0.0032) 9
–0.3977***
PT_Banks GR (p=0.0000) 9
–0.3571***
IT_Banks GR (p=0.0000) 9
–0.3060***
SP_Banks GR (p=0.0000) 9
–0.2391***
IR_Banks GR (p=0.0000) 9
–0.3164***
FR_Banks GR (p=0.0000) 9
–0.1952***
NL_Banks GR (p=0.0000) 9
–0.2742***
DE_Banks GR (p=0.0000) 9
C.
AllCountries AllBanks –0.2223***
(Weighted) (Weighted) (p=0.0035) 9
AllCountries AllBanks –0.2899***
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) (p=0.3447) 9
AllBanks –0.3330***
GR (Weighted) (p=0.0080) 9
AllBanks –0.3679**
GR (Unweighted) (p=0.0282) 9
AllBanks AllCountries –0.2461***
(Weighted) (Weighted) (p=0.0000) 9
AllBanks AllCountries –0.3728***
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) (p=0.0000) 9
AllBanks –0.2777***
(Weighted) GR (p=0.0000) 9
AllBanks –0.2489***
(Unweighted) GR (p=0.000) 9
( Continued )
261The Effect of the PSI in the Relationship Between Sovereign and Bank Credit Risk
TABLE A2. (Continued)
Note:  INT is the PSI interaction variable with the corresponding CDS. Bold values
indicate the pairs of sovereign and bank CDS series in which a long-term relation is observed
in the whole sample period. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. GR, PT, IT, SP, IR, FR, NL, DE
denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior
unsecured daily sovereign CDS premia, respectively and GR_Banks, PT_Banks, IT_Banks,
SP_Banks, IR_Banks, FR_Banks, NL_Banks, DE_Banks denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian,
Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior unsecured daily bank CDS premia,
respectively. AllCountries (Weighted) denotes the weighted sovereign CDS spreads based on
the annual gross domestic product for each country. AllBanks (Weighted) denotes the
weighted bank CDS spreads based on the annual total liabilities of each banking institution
for each country. AllCountries (Unweighted) and AllBanks (Unweighted) denote the
unweighted sovereign and bank aggregate CDS series, respectively.
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TABLE A3. Nonlinear D&P Granger Causality Results for VAR- or VECM- Filtered Data
Period 1
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
A.
GR GR_Banks 0.0133** 0.0774* 0.0501* 0.0595*  0.0995* 0.2185
PT PT_Banks 0.0023*** 0.0027*** 0.0397** 0.0329** 0.0564** 0.0236**
IT IT_Banks 0.0717* 0.2767 0.1256 0.2473 0.3835 0.5603
SP SP_Banks 0.0188** 0.0276** 0.0459** 0.0370** 0.2627 0.4068
IR IR_Banks 0.9072 0.5604 0.9857 0.9710 0.9505 0.8234
FR FR_Banks 0.1298 0.0102** 0.0415** 0.0280**  0.0502* 0.0700*
NL NL_Banks 0.0498** 0.1378 0.0679* 0.1016 0.1547 0.1417
DE DE_Banks 0.1008 0.0020*** 0.0023*** 0.0041*** 0.0184** 0.0197**
GR_Banks GR 0.0044*** 0.0307** 0.2619 0.2977 0.7032 0.7334
PT_Banks PT 0.1508 0.0257** 0.0075*** 0.0100** 0.0089*** 0.0270**
IT_Banks IT 0.1458 0.2533 0.3331 0.4983 0.5709 0.6398
SP_Banks SP 0.0880* 0.0517* 0.0772* 0.1125 0.0616* 0.1474
IR_Banks IR 0.9372 0.7410 0.8580 0.7465 0.7805 0.6060
FR_Banks FR 0.0533* 0.0180** 0.0558* 0.0665* 0.0692* 0.1907
NL_Banks NL 0.3807 0.5188 0.2666 0.4885 0.4753 0.5732
DE_Banks DE 0.0167** 0.0175** 0.0111** 0.1043 0.1209 0.4416
( Continued )
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TABLE A3. (Continued)
Period 1
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
B.
GR PT_Banks 0.0481** 0.1447 0.0871* 0.0689* 0.2091 0.2651
GR IT_Banks 0.1977 0.0418** 0.0194** 0.0323** 0.0448** 0.0996*
GR SP_Banks 0.1070 0.2423 0.4240 0.4637 0.5448 0.4467
GR IR_Banks 0.7542 0.4839 0.8534 0.7551 0.1754 0.1380
GR FR_Banks 0.1036 0.1636 0.1147 0.1511 0.1516 0.3387
GR NL_Banks 0.2633 0.0518* 0.0480** 0.0372** 0.0595* 0.0296**
GR DE_Banks 0.3086 0.2963 0.5439 0.4588 0.6540 0.5198
PT_Banks GR 0.1558 0.2134 0.1264 0.1400 0.5492 0.6217
IT_Banks GR 0.0524*** 0.1137 0.1212 0.2187 0.3519 0.4351
SP_Banks GR 0.0552*** 0.1453 0.0810* 0.0537* 0.1163 0.1965
IR_Banks GR 0.7518 0.8658 0.9271 0.9091 0.9273 0.9438
FR_Banks GR 0.1110 0.6688 0.7689 0.7499 0.6023 0.5968
NL_Banks GR 0.2966 0.1594 0.1631 0.2263 0.2625 0.4535
DE_Banks GR 0.0594*** 0.5836 0.6250 0.3290 0.3977 0.5200
( Continued )
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TABLE A3. (Continued)
Period 1
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
C.
AllCountries AllBanks
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.0516* 0.2312 0.3472 0.3401 0.3641 0.3332
AllCountries AllBanks
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.0756* 0.1900 0.5673 0.3521 0.3391 0.4534
AllBanks
GR (Weighted) 0.2629 0.2327 0.4885 0.3383 0.4922 0.6958
AllBanks
GR (Unweighted) 0.2305 0.2516 0.7355 0.3449 0.5216 0.5652
AllBanks AllCountries 
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.4606 0.0988* 0.2463 0.1858 0.2936 0.1652
AllBanks AllCountries
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.9906 0.6573 0.5928 0.5402 0.9513 0.9373
AllBanks
(Weighted) GR 0.2608 0.2059 0.2541 0.2637 0.4249 0.5832
AllBanks
(Unweighted) GR 0.6577 0.3333 0.3593 0.3298 0.5815 0.7947
( Continued )
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TABLE A3. (Continued)
Period 2
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
A.
GR GR_Banks 0.3517 0.6854 0.7234 0.7906 0.6160 0.4128
PT PT_Banks 0.9823 0.9619 0.9883 0.6673 0.6312 0.6513
IT IT_Banks 0.9040 0.3638 0.1722 0.2600 0.6690 0.6989
SP SP_Banks 0.6350 0.3385 0.2011 0.4946 0.6314 0.6465
IR IR_Banks 0.7338 0.5019 0.2805 0.4128 0.4353 0.6344
FR FR_Banks 0.2514 0.0840* 0.0837* 0.1674 0.2514 0.5194
NL NL_Banks 0.0585* 0.1099 0.0971* 0.2161 0.2664 0.2887
DE DE_Banks 0.0950* 0.0252** 0.0401** 0.2239 0.3248 0.4202
GR_Banks GR 0.3379 0.1029 0.3996 0.6034 0.4054 0.2803
PT_Banks PT 0.1193 0.4142 0.5811 0.5126 0.5559 0.5326
IT_Banks IT 0.0759* 0.0888* 0.5691 0.8557 0.4934 0.3674
SP_Banks SP 0.1359 0.1957 0.6809 0.7789 0.6319 0.7265
IR_Banks IR 0.3496 0.5095 0.4398 0.2124 0.1333 0.3724
FR_Banks FR 0.1477 0.2211 0.1773 0.1311 0.4735 0.6258
NL_Banks NL 0.8168 0.6703 0.3510 0.9030 0.2887 0.8765
DE_Banks DE 0.0189** 0.3881 0.5186 0.3153 0.0349** 0.0329**
( Continued )
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TABLE A3. (Continued)
Period 2
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
B.
GR PT_Banks 0.2614 0.4015 0.6433 0.4548 0.3481 0.5067
GR IT_Banks 0.1244 0.0337** 0.0630* 0.0587* 0.0631* 0.1059
GR SP_Banks 0.0084*** 0.0056*** 0.0021* 0.0306** 0.0405** 0.0828*
GR IR_Banks 0.3682 0.2980 0.8725 0.8707 0.9074 0.8285
GR FR_Banks 0.0064*** 0.0052*** 0.0444** 0.0222** 0.0537* 0.0705*
GR NL_Banks 0.6809 0.4005 0.4931 0.7272 0.7037 0.7836
GR DE_Banks 0.3085 0.1582 0.3244 0.5362 0.6466 0.8356
PT_Banks GR 0.2575 0.6007 0.8187 0.7370 0.5711 0.3477
IT_Banks GR 0.3042 0.5735 0.4720 0.7243 0.8939 0.9577
SP_Banks GR 0.1886 0.0385** 0.0237** 0.0847 0.1104 0.2806
IR_Banks GR 0.5338 0.3651 0.5530 0.2168 0.0635* 0.1741
FR_Banks GR 0.0044*  0.0603* 0.0222** 0.0884* 0.0997* 0.0930*
NL_Banks GR 0.4715 0.3901 0.2253 0.2659 0.2664 0.3390
DE_Banks GR 0.0563* 0.2063 0.3244 0.5786 0.5489 0.6003
( Continued )
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TABLE A3. (Continued)
Period 2
Dependent Independent
Variable Variable l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5 l = 6
C.
AllCountries AllBanks
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.0896* 0.1528 0.0727* 0.3103 0.7967 0.8444
AllCountries AllBanks
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.0842* 0.1561 0.2226 0.6124 0.6271 0.7546
AllBanks
GR (Weighted) 0.1065 0.0695* 0.0709* 0.2277 0.4290 0.7511
AllBanks
GR (Unweighted) 0.2879 0.3759 0.4483 0.6091 0.5312 0.4653
AllBanks AllCountries 
(Weighted) (Weighted) 0.1665 0.2344 0.1168 0.1993 0.4200 0.7035
AllBanks AllCountries
(Unweighted) (Unweighted) 0.0555* 0.0621* 0.0417** 0.0377** 0.0515* 0.0275**
AllBanks
(Weighted) GR 0.1393 0.6991 0.2408 0.3469 0.4074 0.3462
AllBanks
(Unweighted) GR 0.7278 0.9130 0.6020 0.5879 0.5342 0.6079
( Continued )
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TABLE A3. (Continued)
Note:  The table reports p-values of the nonlinear D&P Granger causality test on the VAR- or VECM- filtered data for lags lX = lY = 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6. We test the null hypothesis that there is no Granger causality between the sovereign and bank CDS spreads. *,**,*** denote rejection of
the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. GR, PT, IT, SP, IR, FR, NL, DE denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian,
Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior unsecured daily sovereign CDS premia, respectively and GR_Banks, PT_Banks, IT_Banks,
SP_Banks, IR_Banks, FR_Banks, NL_Banks, DE_Banks denote Greek, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, Irish, French, Dutch and German 5-year senior
unsecured daily bank CDS premia, respectively. AllCountries (Weighted) denotes the weighted sovereign CDS spreads based on the annual gross
domestic product for each country. AllBanks (Weighted) denotes the weighted bank CDS spreads based on the annual total liabilities of each
banking institution for each country. AllCountries (Unweighted) and AllBanks (Unweighted) denote the unweighted sovereign and bank aggregate
CDS series, respectively.
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